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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FOR AND BY
GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
Johan Galtung
I. Introduction: Diagnosis, Prognosis and Therapy?
It is a great honor, following the excellent keynote address on
the future of the UN, to be the first one out, taking up the chal-
lenge by the organizers in the shape of four concerns, the first
aiming at a diagnosis, the second at some prognosis, the third at
some therapy, and the fourth at the very basic question of who
are the carriers of those therapies. Since the major part of my
paper is devoted to the problem of basic UN reform, I will deal
only briefly with these questions as introduction to one of the
possible therapies.
• What is the nature of this time of transition and globalization? Of
course, any time is a time of transition since everything human
possesses historicity. Is “globalization” going on? Yes, at least in
the trivial sense of obvious communication and transportation
changes, which move sense impressions close to the speed of
light and the body close to the speed of sound. We have had
similar changes before expanding the effective range of control
by the powerful beyond the horizon, toward the perimeter of
the nation.
But does that mean that world-building is going on in the
same sense as had nation-building in earlier phases, including
the slow building of national democracies? Possibly. The bulk of
this paper is about some of the ways of approaching global
democracy by introducing mechanisms of accountability for,
hopefully, soft institutions for global governance.
Extended range of control does not mean unopposed control,
however. There is a dialectic in all of this: force begets counter-
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force. Globalize capital even more (it has been fairly interna-
tional for a long time) by breaking down such barriers as social-
ist states, and there will be a reaction in the shape of effective
global trade unions (not so likely) and much more effective
global consumers’ unions (quite likely). The tariff and non-
tariff barriers at the borders of countries served some function;
the new barriers may be inside countries, in people’s minds,
around households, and in local communities. We shall see.
People may like the market, but they may also base their buying
decisions on factors broader than quality and price — the num-
ber of miles a product has traveled with obvious environmental
implications, whether the company practices equal opportunity,
and a preference for locally produced goods, for example.
The same be true for nation, referred to by some as “ethnic-
ity.” Obviously, pressure for global identity may stimulate the
reemergence of alternative identities — regional, national, and
local. When Other comes too close symbolically or in person,
other Selves may be called to the rescue of the person. People
may rediscover identities they thought they had forgotten. Some
of these nations may coalesce into supernations such as the cur-
rent Western Europe. In political terms, regionalization is proba-
bly much more likely. There are some regional solidarities
around — some based on the class position under globalization,
some on national similarities — but we are still far away from a
global solidarity at a level high enough to treat all Others like
Ourselves.
• What are the critical global forces driving the world into the twenty-
first century? They consist of anybody’s list of basic human
needs: the threat to human survival from war and violence in
general; the threat to human well-being from the misery suf-
fered by perhaps 2 billion fellow human beings, much of it
caused by exploitation on a global scale; the threat to human
freedom from neglect of (first-generation) human rights as open
and subtle forms of repression flourish; and the threat to human
identity from the processes of cultural invasion from basically
one powerful center in the West. Add to this the threat to eco-
logical balance, with the increasing likelihood of eco-disasters
around the world as well as perhaps the most frightening phe-
nomenon of them all: the ubiquitous social disintegration, the
Macalester International Vol. 1
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dissolution of the social fabric itself, reducing humans to a set of
cost-benefit calculating monads (Leibniz), cut off from meaning-
ful interaction with almost everybody else.
• Make some suggestions. Let me focus on the process of arriving
at suggestions rather than on concrete proposals. I agree that
such processes have to be global in scope even if there are more
gaps than bridges in that global “system,” and I will take the
basic stand that the scope of global democracy must be
increased before other global processes go too far and present us
with an increasing number of irreversible facts. The loss of a
species would be one example, but what about the loss of a local
or national culture, or of a local or national production capacity,
de-skilling, de-learning?
• Identify the social forces, groups, or states that must come together
to make the transition less destructive and more amenable to a viable
human civilization. As a peace researcher, I think they can be
identified, but as correlations and tendencies rather than in
absolute terms. Take the key fault lines of the human condition
and simply ask: By and large, given that there are peace forces
trying to reduce destructiveness everywhere, where do we find
more, most?
Humans vs. nonhuman nature. I would, nevertheless, gamble
on humans; somewhere there is some capacity for learning. An
intuitive “proof” is that, so far, humanity has muddled through.
Gender. Experience points to women as peace carriers.
Generation. Maybe for women, age matters less. For men, the
guess would be the young and the old, avoiding the middle.
Race. As such, it is correlated with (almost) nothing.
Class. If the upper classes are nationally defined and always
maximize national interests (often the same as their interests)
and the lower classes have no alternative to obedience, then the
upper classes will order the lower classes to kill each other, to
engage in economic aggression, to repress others, and to destroy
nature. The alternative is the (educated?) middle class.
Nation. Nations come in two varieties: (a) the hard nations,
which exclude others and see themselves as above the rest, and
(b) the soft nations, which are more inclusive, see themselves as
Johan Galtung
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equal to others, and are not chosen for leadership. I prefer soft
nations.
Territory. Territories also come in two varieties — big and small
— but the problem is not so much the size as the nature of the
core, the state, and the administration. The bigger the territory,
the more closed, arrogant, secretive, and unaccountable it tends
to become. If it has an army, it may become very dangerous. I
would gamble on small states and even on smaller territorial
units that are not states, such as municipalities.
State vs. Civil Society. Especially in the bigger states, I would
gamble on civil society, both in the shape of peoples organiza-
tions and just as people, unorganized. It is all about people, is it
not? States tend to focus more on accumulation of power for its
own sake.
Capital vs. Civil Society. For the same reason, I would trust
civil society more, both as organizations (trade unions and con-
sumer unions) and just as people. Capital tends to focus more on
the accumulation of capital for its own sake, but a case could
probably be made for the smaller corporations.
State vs. Capital. Both possess enormous power, which is easily
abused. There could be a message in that: How can that power
be harnessed for the sake of peace (the negation of violence),
development (the negation of disintegration and misery), and
the environment (the negation of eco-distaster)? That is the basic
theme: global governance and global democracy.
Who will be the carriers of such processes? Humans, proba-
bly; women more than men; and, to ensure that all age and race
categories are present, democratically represented; based on soft
nations (including soft religion); smaller states and local units;
smaller corporations; and, above all, peoples organizations of all
kinds. All others are also in it. We are all equal in front of these
problems. But perhaps some are more equal in the struggle than
others.
II. Global Governance: Some Preliminary Considerations
With the evaporation of the Cold War came the idea that the
time is ripe for some kind of global governance. Frequent use of
the big power veto, an expression of Cold War conflict, was
Macalester International Vol. 1
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sometimes cited as having stood in the way. With the Cold War
—the “East-West”1 conflict—over, there could be a “new begin-
ning.”2 The North-South conflict3 would constitute no impedi-
ment as no country in the South has veto power, and China
conceives of herself as neither North nor South, as neither East
nor West. The Gulf War, under UN Security Council Resolution
678 (China abstaining), was used as an example of how the UN
was intended, exercising governance in a broadly based coali-
tion, but this was not governance if we define “governance” as
“soft government”: gentle but very explicit persuasion with
mainly positive incentives. It was government in the sense of
enforcing central will on a country, a Member State, in matters
of “peace” (not “development” and “environment”) and as
decided by the Security Council (not by the General Assembly).
The Council quickly abandoned persuasion and positive incen-
tives and escalated from negative incentives (e.g., embargoes
and economic sanctions) to military intervention “with all neces-
sary means.” If such measures were used inside a country by its
central government, we would probably have described it as a
“civil war.” So, maybe the Second Gulf War was exactly that: a
war, or at best extremely “hard governance.” In what follows,
the focus will be on governance in the sense of “soft govern-
ment,” and not on government in the sense of “hard gover-
nance.” In saying so, a line is drawn between Chapter VI and
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
A governance based on Security Council consensus is
wrought with two major problems. First, given the top-heavi-
ness of the UN, this will be power exercised against the small;
the permanent members will protect themselves (and their
clients) with a veto. Second, there is also a high probability that
new cleavages will open up among the big powers: the U.S., the
European Union (EU), Russia, Japan, India, and China;4 four of
them have veto powers (one, the EU, even has two), two of them
do not. Global governance should not be based on a shaky con-
sensus used for dubious geopolitical principles. In addition, the
great conflicts of the age, and not necessarily limited to inter-
states, include the following:
• Humans vs. non-human nature—the environment problema-
tique, within and between countries, possibly with wars over
Johan Galtung
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such scarce resources as oil, water, fertile soil, space as such,
and clean air.
• Gender conflict — with the disappearance of millions of
women annually, in various ways and stages of their life
cycle.
• Generation conflict — with increasing marginalization of the
aged, and possibly also with the use of “death assistance.”
• Race conflict — particularly cruel on the Red and the Black,
and with Whites becoming an ever smaller (desperate?)
minority.
• Class conflict — producing starvation in the South and unem-
ployment in the North in a very badly managed world econ-
omy.
• Nation conflict — producing apparently endless cycles of vio-
lence in the pursuit of autonomy, independence, and nation-
states.
III. Global Democracy: Some Preliminary Considerations
All of this has to be well articulated for conflicts to be ade-
quately handled, and the best tested approach in the world
today is democracy. As the title of this paper indicates, global
governance is seen as having global democracy both as a cause
and as an effect. Only by evolving together in mutually support-
ive processes can we obtain valid results, serving all human
beings on Earth,5 by promoting development-environment and
security-peace. I, then, define democracy as rule by which rulers
have the consent of the ruled. If that consent is withdrawn, then
the rulers have to stop ruling. Consent can be obtained either by
the age-old method of dialogue until differences have been
evened out or by the more modern method of debating and then
calling a popular vote on issues, not only having elections of
officials. The concept of “rule by consent” is deeper than the
method of obtaining the consensus or the method of ascertain-
ing the level of consent. Democracy can be based on both
processes.6
Why is democracy so important? Because human beings are
important. Over time we should be entitled to assume that a
Macalester International Vol. 1
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democratic country will evolve in the directions the citizens
want because the policies are expressions of the “general will.”
More particularly, we would assume democracies to be best at
handling domestic problems where people are more in charge.
But, development-environment and security-peace today have
heavy global dimensions and affect social classes differently. In
a democracy, domestic policies will be better attuned to the
needs of all classes; in a nondemocracy, rulers will favor their
favorites. This world is not a global democracy.
The world as a political system combines anarchic features of
nonrule with hierarchical features of nondemocratic rule, and
the world as an economic system is based on hidden rule. As a
consequence, development-environment policies tend to hurt
lower-class people in lower-class countries badly, and security-
peace policies tend to be in the interest of upper-class countries,
launching, for instance, international crime tribunals against
marginalized people in marginalized countries. The world is not
a democracy, which means that not everybody can be given a
voice;7 there is little or no dialogue toward consensus, and the
majority will of humans or even states play a minor role.
The error of equating the sum of domestic democracies with
global democracy is surprisingly common. Clearly, there are
two different levels involved. It is not difficult to imagine a fed-
eral country where states, republics, and cantons are democratic
but the center not. The center can wipe out any democratically
agreed upon policy in the periphery through “intervention.” 
We would not expect the benefits of democracy to accrue to 
that population since democracy, obviously, has to apply to all
levels.
In human history, there have probably always been enclaves
of democracy, perhaps particularly of the dialogical, consensus-
oriented variety. The problem is to extend this pattern to ever
broader circles of human organization without forgetting the
inner circles, including the most important—the capacity of the
individual human being for inner dialogue and doubt.
There are several reasons why democracies do not necessarily
behave democratically or peacefully at the world level, and why
they might behave more peacefully if we had more global
democracy.
Johan Galtung
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1. Western democracies have come out of individualistic, com-
petitive, and even aggressive cultures, which, to some extent,
are still there.
2. Western democracies have a history of inflicting trauma upon
others (e.g., slavery and colonialism), and, harboring fears of
victims who want revenge, they act accordingly.
3. Western democracies are at the top of the world socioeco-
nomic pyramid and may harbor fears of those lower down
wanting revolutionary changes; thus, they act accordingly
when those at the bottom of the pyramid make the slightest
move.
4. Some Western democracies have problems—(2) and (3)
above—within their own countries and might want to pre-
empt any revenge or revolution in the world system for fear
of domestic spillover.
5. Democracies share decision-making with the people, but peo-
ple are not necessarily peaceful. They may be the carriers of
“chosen people” complexes and unresolved conflicts of all
kinds, predisposing them to negative behavior and attitudes
toward conflict.
6. Democracies are generally better at implementing human
rights, but that may also make it easier for the governments to
invoke human duties, e.g., to “defend your country.”
7. Democracies are based on competition for power, letting the
people name the winner. Aggression at the world level might
be used to gain elections.
8. Democracies are generally more peaceful domestically
because people have had their way (or more of it), but that
also means that the military, not fearing a revolt at home, has
nothing else to do and can leave the country for a war abroad.
9. Democracies tend toward high levels of self-righteousness —
“being democracies, our policies cannot be wrong.”
Three conclusions emerge from these reflections.
First, democracies are probably better than nondemocracies at
reaching all four objectives — development-environment and
security-peace — at home where the majority counts. Heavy
Macalester International Vol. 1
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gains should be possible if more countries become democracies
to the extent that cause-effect cycles are domestic. Second, to the
extent they are not, but like environment and peace are clearly
indivisible, respecting no borders, democracies are not necessar-
ily better in their world (“foreign”) policies, and particularly not
where peace is concerned. They may be worse. Third, for the
linkage between democracy, peacefulness, and other benefits to
accrue in the world, there has to be democracy at the world
level, global democracy. Nobody would expect that to happen
very soon. After all, the democracies as we know them are not
perfect either, being, in fact, more parliamentocracies than democ-
racies, with the remarkable exception of Switzerland.8
There are processes toward more democracy; more can be
done. Consider one important example of how far away the
world is from the benefits we might expect from democratiza-
tion: income distribution. According to the United Nations
Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report
1992,9 “the richest 20 percent of the world’s people get at least
150 times more than the poorest 20 percent.” But, if the compari-
son is based on the richest and poorest countries only, disre-
garding the maldistribution within countries, “in 1960, the
richest 20 percent of the world’s population had incomes 30
times greater than the poorest 20 percent. By 1990, the richest 20
percent were getting 60 times more.”10 In other words, a scan-
dalous situation is getting even worse. A more democratic
world would not have tolerated this.
IV. Building Blocs for Democratic Global Governance
If the goal is the evolution of a more democratic global gover-
nance, then there are many basic questions to be asked. For
instance:
• What kind of power should be exercised? Cultural/norma-
tive (moral authority)? Economic/exchange (rewarding those
who conform, sanctioning those who do not)? Military/coer-
cive (punishing those who do not conform, but not those who
do)? Political/decision power (if only in the form of resolu-
tions)?
Johan Galtung
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• How much power should be exercised? Similar to a unitary
state, binding on all citizens and in all fields? Similar to a fed-
eration, binding on all parts but not in all fields? Similar to a
confederation, binding on all parties in any field, but only if
all agree? Or, even looser, similar to the present UN, i.e., more
like recommendations except under very special circum-
stances?
• What is the source of legitimacy for global power? Big power
concert? One-state-one-vote? One-human-being-one-vote?11
• What should be the building blocs of global governance, or,
who are the world citizens? Territorial units such as states in
the inter-state system?12 Collective units such as voluntary
associations or economic organizations? Individuals orga-
nized in constituencies as in a country? All of the above?
Since the focus will be on the fourth question — who are the
world citizens — I would like to first make some remarks con-
cerning the other three. The first question has to do with the
range of power, how many kinds, how broad or narrow; the sec-
ond with the depth of power, how deep or shallow; and the
third with that elusive quality making even coercive power
legitimate and not only in the eyes of the power-wielders.
This gives us the following four well-known combinations:
1. Broad and deep power: unitary or federal systems;
2. Broad but shallow power: confederal systems;
3. Narrow but deep power: regimes; and
4. Narrow and shallow power: conventions, agencies.
The combination preferred here for global governance is the
second: broad but shallow power. Let all kinds of power come
into play but homeopathically. Power is at its best in small
quantities. Governance can be extended over the whole spec-
trum of human issues, persuading gently, using incentives —
mainly positive—here and there with a velvet glove, and taking
time for a consensus to emerge. If power cuts too deep, getting
into details and microcontrol—and, in addition, with an iron fist
— chances are good that the exercise of power will become
counterproductive. There must be some flexibility, even the
option of withdrawal. Peace is not kept or enforced by creating a
Macalester International Vol. 1
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cemetery, as Tacitus remarked. Governance is not a goal itself.
Human livelihood is.
The best guarantee seems to be legitimacy vested in democ-
racy, meaning one world citizen — territorial, collective, or individ-
ual-one vote. The positive argument has been set forth above, but
there is also a negative argument. Nondemocratic legitimacy
such as veto-based Security Council resolutions will be chal-
lenged. Democratic culture is so widespread today that people
all over the world will challenge undemocratic procedures.
They may accept some nondemocratic procedures for some
time, such as a big power-run UN, but they will inreasingly
demand processes in a more democratic direction, involving all
“world citizens” and at the world level. They will demand
global democracy.13
V. A Mini-Theory of Democracy
In order for democracy, that is, rule with the consent of the
ruled, to function, the citizens have to articulate their concerns
continuously, not only in election years and as total programs.
The concerns have to be received by those in command. There
has to be communication and, beyond that, dialogue involving
the citizenry. The process for arriving at decisions, whether
based on consensus or voting, must be legitimate. Only then can
democracy bear the fruits: better attention to the concerns of
everybody with nonviolent solution of problems and conflicts.
This holds for domestic as well as for global democracy. For
domestic democracy, the citizens are those who satisfy the con-
ditions for participation in elections. For global democracy, it is
more complex for reasons that also reflect on domestic democ-
racy—there are important loopholes in democratic theory.
Who are these “world citizens” referred to as building blocs
above? A frequently encountered conceptualization of modern
society may be useful here. There are three components: State
(the governing organizations), Capital (the economic organiza-
tions), and Civil Society (all the other, countless organizations
according to kinship, vicinity and affinity, interest [“workship”],
and value [“worship”]). Then, there are People, some of them
running State and Capital but mainly in Civil Society. Political
science specializes in State, economics in Capital, sociology in
Johan Galtung
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Civil Society, and psychology in People. Integrated views are
rare.
Given four kinds of power (normative, exchange, coercive,
and decision power) and three components of society, how is
power divided among the components? Is there some special-
ization? In fact, all three components occasionally exercise all
four kinds of power, including parents in families run by adults,
particularly males, but there are also specializations.
Thus, the classical State with a legislature for decisions, an
executive with military and police, and a judiciary for normative
power is the seat not only of decision-making but also of norma-
tive power, laying down what is right and wrong, and of ulti-
mate coercive power, the ultima ratio regis. But, the State also
accumulates economic power through taxation, customs, and its
own businesses; and it is criticized by some for having amassed
too much of the power assets and by others for having too little.
Capital obviously possesses economic power, perhaps not
enough to buy the State (except for some smaller ones) but
enough to buy some of the people running the state, possibly the
key formula for corruption.14 In addition, however, they decide
which products, goods, and services to put on the market,
meaning heavy decision power. Of normative and coercive
power, there is little.
What kinds of power does Civil Society/People possess? If
the State has monopoly on ultimate coercive power and Capital
over economic power, then what is left to associations and peo-
ple? Ultimate normative/moral power, legitimacy, and deci-
sion-making — the very foundations of democracy. This does
not mean that people are better morally than their rulers and
their merchant-providers; but if “he who has a hammer sees the
world as a nail,” and Civil Society possesses neither armies nor
capital, then problems are seen as moral rather than military or
economic, in need of basic choices and new departures. How is
the democratic program of communication-dialogue-decision
realized in the triad State – Capital – Civil Society? Not so well.
Democracy works in only one pair, State – Civil Society. The leg-
islature is the communication link between Civil Society and the
executive part of the State, the legislature, in principle, having
the upper hand at least in long-term policymaking. In practice,
Macalester International Vol. 1
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the elected legislators handle the cross-pressure between Civil
Society and Executive more or less well.
Missing both in theory and practice is the dialogue between
Capital (producers/distributors) and Civil Society (consumers),
and between Capital and State. Capital should ideally be orga-
nized in a more democratic and transparent manner,15 with open
channels of communication for dialogue both with Civil Society
and with State. As they all depend upon one another, there will
be communication anyhow. Capital and State will accommodate
each other, often using legislators under cross-pressure. The
result: massive corruption.
The facile answer that the marketplace is the communication
channel between Capital (seller) and Civil Society (households
and buyers) misses the basic point: the open dialogue for joint
decisions. Capital can study market behavior with observations,
interviews, and questionnaires and arrive at conclusions about
consumer preferences, but this is spying on people rather than
dialoguing with them, similar to what the Executive often does
with polls. Democracy leaves Capital out in the cold in the name
of the freedom of the free market, and Civil Society is usually 
let in only every four years or so. In the end, they both operate
behind the scenes, organizing lobbies to influence State 
decision-makers.16
Traditionally, the Church has been the seat of ultimate moral
power. The State and Civil Society have been fighting for control
over the Church because the Church can bestow transcendental
legitimacy. The doctrine of the separation of State and Church
divided the top of society, allowing for more power to Civil
Society, while the doctrine of economic enterprise as a kind of
sacrament17 invited Capital into the moral body of the society —
on top — just as the doctrine of democracy devolved ultimate
decision-making to the bottom, the people. The doctrine of free
market behavior even gave Capital godlike attributes: Man (and
Woman?) proposes, Capital disposes. In theory, at least.
In classical feudal society in Europe, the prince made all
important decisions, especially in military and economic mat-
ters, there being no independent Capital or Civil Society. The
only challenge was the Church. The battle over ultimate power
was ferocious, ending with an agreement on mutual noninter-
Johan Galtung
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vention (concordat), but universal religion came back as ideol-
ogy.
In the socialist construction that came to an end in Europe in
Fall 1989, the Party made all important decisions, including mil-
itary and economic matters, there being no independent Capital
or Civil Society. The only challenge was the State, and after 1989
power ultimately devolved from the Party to the State with
more or less Civil Society/People participation (democracy).
Maybe the general moral of the story is as follows. There is no
simple solution with four components having one kind of
power each. So, we had better draw upon all of them, let them
play against one another, and have a maximum of dialogue and
some central mechanisms for arriving at final decisions.
For complex problems and the problems of modern society
and the modern world, only complex structures will do. Since
direct, open communication and dialogue can involve only a
limited number of citizens directly, the Media have to enter as
one more component, doing exactly what the name indicates:
mediating communication. Inserting themselves into the quad-
rangle State – Capital – Civil Society – People, they risk being
controlled by a censorious state, being economically dependent
upon Capital advertising and takeover, being used by special
interest groups in Civil Society, and being dependent on People
for sales, meaning catering to sensations rather than being carri-
ers of dialogues. An almost impossible situation, and yet some
media manage. One formula for survival is probably to play on
all corners of the quadrangle, giving a little to each and never
everything to any one. In that way, good media become a reflec-
tion of a working democracy—keeping a balance yet remember-
ing that nothing in the world is more precious than life and that
sooner or later some decisions have to be made, reflecting the
interests of life.
Remove the Media from the democracies in the world today
and we would be back to local democracy with village bulletin
boards and town meetings. However attractive, this is insuffi-
cient for the reasons argued above: democracies cannot survive in
the long run if the supersystems they are parts of are not democratic,
nor can they survive if the subsystems they are composed of are not
democratic. The Media are part of it to the point that national
democracies are only as good as the national media and global
Macalester International Vol. 1
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democracy is only as good as global media, which today are run
essentially by the single military and media superpower.
VI. A Road to Global Governance and Democracy: 
Improving the UN
Let us now use these reflections to design a democratic system
of global governance, taking the United Nations as a point of
departure. Regional and functional governance may emerge in
many places, but it is hard to see how an improved system of
global governance could emerge except by building on, improv-
ing, and democratizing the UN system. The building blocs
would be the “world citizens,” the world-system counterparts of
the four components of modern society. They are as follows:
• Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) are the world ver-
sion of the State: the “Aegis,” the United Nations system
above the Aegis, the UN General Assembly (UNA, which
could be renamed as the UN Governments’ Assembly) above
the UN, the Security Council above the UNA in security mat-
ters (Article 12), and the veto powers above them all.
• The Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are the world version
of Capital: the “Tics,” with no particular organization on top.
• The Interpeople Organizations are the world version of Civil
Society: the “IPOs” (also known as the Nongovernmental
Organizations, or “NGOs”), with no particular organization
on top.
• The People are still the world version of People: with formal
equality but with the heads of the other three components
above the 5.6 billion human beings in the world today.
Together the states-Aegis, corporations-Tics, associations-
IPOs, and People are the world citizens, the building blocs for
any system of global governance.18 The states-Aegis are best at
articulation, but if we want democratic global governance, they
all have to be in it, one way or the other. The set of all Aegis can-
not constitute a world government, however; but if that set had
a structure with a coordination council, we would come closer.
We could imagine the heads, or representatives, of all Aegis par-
ticipating in that coordination council, like ministers represent-
Johan Galtung
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ing their ministries in a cabinet government. Most of the UN
Specialized Agencies, etc. are functional Aegis or can be seen as
such, but the heads of the UN Specialized Agencies do not form
a world cabinet — rather a coordination committee at most, the
Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC). There is no
global governance legitimacy nor any real interest in exercising
global governance. Why?
One answer is that if they had that legitimacy and interest,
they would compete with the Member States; the UNA, in gen-
eral, and the Security Council with veto powers, in particular.
Territorial legitimacy still ranks above functional legitimacy;
regionalism above functionalism; state power above capital,
above professionalism in general and even above moral power.
However, this means that we have two roads to global gover-
nance based on the state system, devolving power upward from
States: (a) the territorial way of organizing the Heads of States or
their representatives with Heads of Big Powers as special case
and (b) the functional way of organizing the Heads of Aegis
with Heads of UN Agencies as special case. The former makes
Member States the building blocs while the latter makes the
Aegis the building blocs. The latter plays down the States, but
also creates more distance from the People. A citizen who has
something to articulate has a shorter distance to the top through
his own government than through the IGO delegation of his
own government.
In the European Union,19 a regional organization so far com-
posed of approximately 6 percent of humankind, these two
roads lead to the European Council for the Heads of State and
Government with the Council of Ministers as their representa-
tives (foreign or EU affairs) by using the territorial approach;
and, using the functional approach, to the European Commis-
sion with intricate relations among them and the other two
major institutions, the Court and the Parliament. No doubt the
double-track EU experience will play a major role in any future
formulation of global governance as positive and negative mod-
els and scenarios.
One important point can be noted immediately: the commis-
sion is much more than a committee of heads of functional agen-
cies, similar to ministries at the state level. It is composed with a
view to function as a body with a president who becomes the
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de facto EU president. At a minimum, the UN could equip the
ACC with a similar function (e.g., with a UN deputy secretary-
general as president, possibly even the secretary-general him-
self).
We encounter the same two roads in connection with Civil
Society. People could come together in a World Assembly as
they do in democracies, electing representatives from con-
stituencies. In theory, the world could be one constituency, but
the simplest solution today would be to let each country or peo-
ple (for the indigenous peoples or noncountry people in general)
be a constituency20 with the right and duty to elect, say, one repre-
sentative per country or people up to one million members and then
one additional participant for each one million members. The assem-
bly of these participants could then constitute a United Nations
People’s Assembly (UNPA), the Second UN Assembly.21
The second road to the top passes via the Interpeople Organi-
zations.22 The heads or representatives of all IPOs could also
constitute an assembly (like the Conference of Nongovernmen-
tal Organizations, CONGO, at present). There is no domestic
parallel with general social power, only trade union and interre-
ligious councils of organizations in the same field.
For Capital, one homologue would be branch councils, from
the guilds of earlier ages, to set standards, regulate competition,
protect the branch against outside pressure, and negotiate deals.
Theoretically, all economic organizations in any one country
could come together in a national Chamber of Commerce and
elect a representative to a World Assembly, but the Tics, being
transnationally integrated, are probably more important build-
ing blocs. A world TNC assembly would bring together enor-
mous capital power that would not necessarily be more
competitive than states.
If we now assume that a global governance worthy of the
name would have to bring together for articulation, dialogue,
and final decision-making world versions of State, Capital, Civil
Society, and People, then we are approaching something with
adequate complexity. The state system will still play the major
role for some time, but moribund remnants of feudalism such as
big power veto, voting power according to capital, and the fixed
location of the UN in a major big power can gradually be abol-
ished. Those defending feudalism define themselves out of
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court by demonstrating contempt for democratic values how-
ever “realist” they may sound. The States, being successful but
also potentially dangerous, should become better world citizens
by being locked into democratic global governance.
People should certainly not be disregarded but rather have a
direct impact on any democratic global governance, not, how-
ever, via the State (a governmental organization, or “GO”) or
some IPOs. There is no alternative to world direct elections, sup-
plemented by world initiatives and referenda, which are bound
to come sooner or later.
Having said all of this, then, why not also include Capital as
partners in democracy? Why all this talk about corporate states
and fascism the moment the argument is made that corporations
should also participate in articulation, dialogue, and decision-
making openly arrived at? Given their enormous significance
for all life on earth, it is imperative to make them more responsi-
ble and responsive, and, above all, more accountable. A world
assembly of Tics would not be the ultimate power in the world
but a force to reckon with, an untapped reservoir of world citi-
zens; highly relevant to the four major world concerns.
The recommendation/conclusion so far would include a
World Assembly of States, a World Assembly of People, and a
World Assembly of Tics, with a World Assembly of Aegis, a
World Assembly of IPOs, and a World Assembly of Chambers
of Commerce in the background, as consultative bodies. How
can these building blocs be woven together?
The position taken here is to graft them onto the infant global
governance that already has accumulated experience in its two
incarnations in this century—the United Nations building upon
the League of Nations. In practice, this means adding to the
UNA for governments (the World Assembly of States) a Second
Assembly, UNPA (for People), including indigenous people,
and a Third Assembly, UNCA (for corporations).23
So, the three major components of global governance would
be the following:
• United Nations General Assembly (UNA), already in exis-
tence;
• United Nations People’s Assembly (UNPA), as a Second
Chamber; and
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• United Nations Corporate Assembly (UNCA), as a Third
Assembly.
This raises questions of conditions for membership and of the
interrelationship in decision-making power among the three.
Applicant states have to be recognized by the current Member
States in order to become members of the UN. Actually admit-
ted is the government, not the people, since very few govern-
ments ask their people whether they want to join.24 They are
assessed by other states. Here are some possible criteria for a
non-territorial “world citizen” wanting to be admitted to UNPA
or UNCA.25
1. Is the organization internationally representative? Does it
have members in a sufficient number of countries distributed
over a sufficient number of continents, preferably across cul-
tural and political in addition to geographical divides?
2. Is the organization sufficiently democratic? Is the leadership
of the organization accountable to the members? Can the
leadership be changed through a process of election?
3. Is the organization concerned with human interests? Or, is the
focus on rather narrow interests of rather special groups?
4. Is the organization capable of reflecting world perspectives?
Or, is the perspective highly circumscribed (e.g., regional,
national, etc.)?
5. Does the organization have a certain permanence? Or, is it
rather ephemeral, something that easily withers away?
Imagine that we now apply such reasonable criteria to states.
Point one would favor multicultural states, provided the rulers
are capable of reflecting that kind of diversity. Point two would
favor democracies. Point three looks for a general human soli-
darity as opposed to solidarity with own gender, generation,
race, class, and nation only. Point four focuses on world inter-
ests, not only on promoting limited state (national) interests.
Point five favors states with proven permanence.
Of these five tests, many states would pass only the last, “per-
manence,” interpreted as territorial control, which means that
neither secession nor revolution are around the corner. If they
were, recognition could be withheld, but that criterion is possi-
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bly the least meaningful for the IPOs, undergoing fission and
fusion, coming in and out of existence, all the time, operating as
they are in an unlimited functional space, not constrained by the
finiteness of world territory. In choosing criteria such as the five
mentioned, we would in fact be judging IPOs more severely
than we judge states. But then, why not? Why should the criteria
remain constant? To demand of a president or secretary-general
that she or he have the members fully “under control,” with no
minorities seceding or revolting, would certainly undermine the
marvelous flexibility of IPOs.
Would these criteria also apply to Tics? A TNC is often inter-
nationally representative and relatively permanent, but far from
democratic. Maybe it should be democratic? Maybe production
for basic human needs and world perspectives beyond size of
assets and turnover should have priority, including employing
as many people—not as few—as possible?
Delegates to UNA will continue to be selected by the govern-
ments, but to UNPA and UNCA, they should ideally be democ-
ratically elected.26 Imagine, then, that we have UNA, UNPA, and
UNCA well constituted. How do they relate to one another?
Using the modern society as a model with the usual division of
state power in executive, legislative, and judiciary, then UNA
(corresponding to the European Union Council of Ministers) is
one executive as a government exercising (soft) governance and
the Specialized Agencies (corresponding to the European Com-
mission) another, albeit in very embryonic form. The legislature,
in even less than embryonic form, would be the UNPA, with
both the UNA and the Specialized Agencies being accountable
to the United Nations People’s Assembly. (The World Court and
the International Court of Justice [ICJ] would play the role of the
judiciary.) This is what parliamentary democracy, as we know
it, with the addition of the two executive heads corresponding to
the territorial and the functional tracks, would inspire us to con-
struct at the world level. Does it make sense?
Certainly, if we take democracy, including its weakened, indi-
rect, parliamentary form, seriously. That the resistance against
curtailing power and privilege is considerable (as it was once
upon a time in the House of Lords) and that the road will be
twisted and complex is obvious, but somehow this is the road
the world will have to go. At any rate, it is the road it will proba-
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bly go given the power of domestic governance as a model for
global governance. Power will not be easily ceded to the people.
Even in the European Union, the European Parliament has
mainly consultative status, probably to be expanded in the near
future.
In fact, the state system model is probably likely to be the EU,
with its shortcomings and achievements. A major achievement
of the EU is peace among the members, at least so far. A major
shortcoming is the threat of collision with outsiders, particularly
with unions of states like itself.27 The peace achievement would
be highly useful for the world even if it is only inter-state, and
the shortcoming less of a problem if we assume the whole world
to be on the inside and no outsiders in the galactic system. Actu-
ally, full democratization is not necessary for some of the peace
effects of governance to show up.
The conclusion/recommendation would be a gradual transfer
of ultimate power from UNA to UNPA and, at the same time, a
UN Commission of Heads of Agencies to balance the territorial,
state-oriented leadership of UNA at the functional, specialized
level. There is something fascinating in positing the specialist
against the generalist and then having the People’s Assembly as
the final arbiter (and the ICJ to supervise it all). What, then, hap-
pens to the United Nations Corporate Assembly?
One model would be similar to the UN Economic and Social
Council (of the General Assembly), but the UNCA could also
participate in an advisory capacity and develop its own internal
procedures for how corporations can contribute not only to
development and the environment but also to security and
peace. Such plans could be presented to both the UNA and the
UNPA for dialogue, approval, and follow-up. The incentive for
participation would be increased legitimacy for the corporations
that follow such rules, whether they are UNCA members or not,
overcoming left-wing suspicion and right-wing enthusiasm for
capital.
VII. Conclusion: No Global Governance 
without Global Democracy
A system of this kind would bring in all four types of power and
all four components of the modern world. The interplay would
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be complex, but, as argued, nothing less than a complex global
governance can ever cope with a very, very complex world.
However, adequacy through complexity is only one side of the
story; democracy is the other. What we have seen of UN gover-
nance since the end of the Cold War, including the Gulf and the
Bosnia operations, Somalia, Rwanda, and the ongoing operation
of the Bretton Woods institutions as a de facto world Ministry of
Finance, reminds us more of highly autocratic regimes than of
what would have been tolerated inside functioning democra-
cies. Even a world government entitled to overrule Member
States may be too much, a problem the European Union is run-
ning into, probably increasingly so.28 Global governance, not
world government;29 central authority, not central government.
How does one continue on this road? One continues by exper-
imenting with world assemblies of transnational corporations
and international peoples’ organizations, having the UN do the
selection to begin with. They could meet during the summer to
discuss the UNA Agenda for that coming session and be on call
as consultants. Then comes the emergence of a World Assembly
of People, based on direct election from countries that are ready
for this and direct selection from others, the understanding
being that over time the condition for membership in the Second
Chamber UNPA is democratic election of delegates. The UNPA
will offer well-seasoned inputs to a UNA gradually liberated
from big power veto. In short, a gradual rather than a dramatic
scenario.
Notes
1. The conflict was actually between the world Northeast (the socialist coun-
tries) and the world Northwest (the capitalist democracies) with Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members from the
world Southeast (Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) joining the latter. By far,
most of the countries in the South, East, or West were nonaligned. The term
“East-West” conflict is Eurocentric, or “North-centric.” This has important
political ramifications, such as overestimating the significance for the world as
a whole of conflict formations and conflict transformations in the North while
at the same time underestimating their significance in the South.
2. Of course, that was already some time ago. The governments of the world
were caught unprepared by the Cold War evaporating before their eyes and
had no blueprint for peace or global governance ready. In the meantime, some
of that momentum was lost, but there will be more “new beginnings.”
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3. The conflict is actually between the world Northwest, as defined in note 1,
and the world Southwest, meaning Latin America, the Caribbean, West Asia,
the Arab World, Africa, and South Asia. With the ex-socialist countries
increasingly acquiring a role in the world economy similar to that of the Third
World countries, rather than “North-South” conflict, we should talk about
“Northwest and Southeast-Southwest and Northeast” conflict, reflecting the
two growth poles in the world at present, the Northwest and the Southeast
(East and Southeast Asia). Again, this is a point filled with political ramifica-
tions as the lineup in any organization for global governance may be different
from what it was during the Cold War.
4. To this might be added a Slavic/Orthodox big power crystallizing around
Russia and an Islamic big power crystallizing around Turkey, both of them
outcomes of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which was, in many ways,
a multicultural society. Among the six, only four would have veto powers, the
EU even having two vetoes. Far from being a big power concert, major conflict
formations are already visible in the U.S.-Japan dyad and the EU-Russia-
Turkey triad. See Johan Galtung, “The Emerging Conflict Formations,” in
Restructuring for World Peace: On the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century, ed.
Majid and Katherine Tehranian (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1992). In the
article, a number of combinations are spelled out as future possibilities, some-
times crystallizing around religions. Thus, in the pan-European space at pre-
sent, including Turkey and the Central Asian republics of the ex – Soviet
Union, Catholic and Protestant Christianity are relatively integrated, and
Judaism has been almost eliminated by genocide in Christian countries. How-
ever, the Catholic-Orthodox schism of 1054 has not been healed, and the Chris-
tian-Muslim divide is probably widening. Of course, there are always other
factors, such as class in the sense of the reality or fear of being repressed
and/or exploited, expansionist tendencies of certain states, traumas from the
past calling for revenge, etc. More particularly, the Catholic/Protestant Chris-
tianity-Orthodox Christianity-Islam triad has contained the raw material for
conflict for generations, even centuries, contained so far by the authoritarian
regimes of the ex-socialist countries. They all converge in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
aggravated by the sense of being border people, on the religious dividing line.
This is only one example of the naïveté of any analysis assuming that with the
end of the Cold War the total conflict material in the world decreased.
5. Some might even go further to say “all life on earth,” in other words, bioc-
racy, not only democracy. In either case, the future would be included as
future generations.
6. Dialogical democracy is often associated with African and Oriental political
structures, debating/voting democracy with the Occident. Voting is based on
head-counting, in other words, on assumptions of individualism and on win-
ners and losers. Dialogues can be based on collectivism and organicism, con-
ceiving of the polity as corpus mysticum within which dialogues take place to
the benefit of all parts of the “body politic,” with no winners or losers. One
great advantage of a dialogue, i.e., brainstorming, is the emergence of new
ideas; one great advantage of voting (in elections, referenda, etc.) is to provide
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a stop signal for a debate, regardless of how big the group is. To press one type
of democracy onto a culture based on the other is, of course, cultural colonial-
ism; neither of them has a monopoly on the idea of democracy. The interesting
problem is how they can be combined.
7. The Russian word for “giving voice” is glasnost.
8. Of the approximately 500 national referenda carried out in the world this
century, 300 took place in Switzerland, meaning that a country with about one
per mile of the world population has 60 percent of the democracy as measured
by that indicator.
9. Published by the United Nations Development Programme (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
10. Op. cit., p. 1. It is worth noting that the worst national disparity, Brazil, with
“26 times between the richest 20 percent of the people and the poorest 20 per-
cent according to their per capita income” is still far better than that of the
world (p. 3).
11. I am indebted to Professor Toshiki Mogami of the International Christian
University, Tokyo, for his analysis of UN legitimacy in terms of generations
(although he does not explicitly add individual-based democracy). See his The
Problem of Legitimacy in the UN (Tokyo: International Christian University,
1993).
12. This is also known as the Westphalian model from 1648 but is anarchic
and/or hierarchical/feudal with no global (or regional) governance.
13. There is an interesting parallel to the decolonization after the Second World
War, presumably fought for democracy: colonialism was untenable after-
wards. In the same vein, big powers at the top of the world pyramid, arguing
very well for democracy and (first generation) human rights all over the
world, undermine their own hegemonic position in the world system. World
feudalism increasingly becomes untenable.
14. One perspective is that corruption is implicit in what has been said in the
text: when good, legitimate channels for dialogues are absent, Capital will do
what it is good at — lobbying and bribery. Not all of that will disappear with
better channels of communication, but some will.
15. Organizations of guilds based on profession (crafts, trades) rather than kin-
ship existed in Europe in the Middle Ages and Early Modern periods. One
major function was mutual protection. They were hardly transparent and
democratic and may be one reason why assemblies of economic organizations,
or corporations, have a bad name, being associated with “corporatism” and
fascism. However, the problem of inadequate or nonexisting communication
channels while “adequate” channels are nontransparent and conducive to
massive corruption remains and has to be solved regardless of flawed concep-
tions and practices in the past.
16. For the important role played by these parts of Civil Society, see Johan Gal-
tung, “Eastern Europe Fall 1989 — What Happened and Why? A Theory
Sketch,” Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 14 (1992): 75 – 97.
Had the state system in the Cold War “theater” functioned in a democratic
manner, these organizations would hardly even have existed, not being
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needed. The strength of a society is very much a function of such reserves for
action in times of crises.
17. Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is in this cate-
gory.
18. Some would argue that animals (and potentially other forms of life) should
be added to this list of world citizens, possibly as represented by human
ombudsmen or -women, each one (or a committee) representing one species.
19. This is becoming an ever closer union as the Maastricht Treaty (possibly in
some slightly modified version ) gradually enters into force. For a detailed dis-
cussion, see Dusan Sidjanski, L’avenir federaliste de l’Europe (Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 1992).
20. Another formula would focus on nations rather than countries, bringing up
the whole problematique of nonrepresented nations and indigenous peoples.
One formula might build on existing organizations working toward a United
Nations Assembly of Nonrepresented/Indigenous Nations.
21. The idea is promoted today, if not exactly in the form advocated here, by
CAMDUN, the Conference for a More Democratic United Nations. See “CAM-
DUN-2: The United Nations and a New World Order for Peace and Justice,” in
Report of the Second International Conference on a More Democratic United Nations
(Vienna 1991: London and New York: Camdun Project, 1992).
22. These are usually called “NGOs,” but that term is avoided here, as it
appears to refer to people as “nongovernment.”
23. UNPA and UNCA could, in the first run, be admitted to the UN system
under Article 22: “The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.”
24. Switzerland did so for UN membership in March 1986, and the answer was
no. As of Fall 1994, only three governments of the twelve presumably democ-
ratic Member States of the European Union (Denmark, France, and Ireland)
have had a referendum over something so fundamental as the Maastricht
Treaty.
25. From the author’s United Nations, United Peoples (forthcoming).
26. In practice, a transition period of ten or twenty years may be in order with a
governmental pledge to work for a system of election rather than selection, or
appointment of delegates.
27. This would be similar to an Orthodox-Slavic union of Russia, Byelorussia,
(Eastern) Ukraine, and (Northern) Kazakhstan, and a Muslim-Turkish union
of Turkey and the five ex-Soviet Muslim republics with Turkish languages (all
except Tadzhikistan). It should be noted that the European Union consists
mainly of Catholic/Protestant–Roman/Germanic countries.
28. Subsidiarity would be the general rule, as much downward autonomy as
possible, including local-level governance and democratic governance at all
levels.
29. For a formulation of that position, see Johan Galtung, The True Worlds (New
York: Free Press, 1980), chapter 8, “World Organization,” and, particularly, 8.1,
“A World Central Authority.”
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